1 to meet the Paris Agreement goal of limiting temperature change to between 1.5 and 2.0
Climate Action Report (CAR) 4 and Second Biennial Report (SBR) 5 , we make a number of revisions to both historical and projected emissions using consistent global warming potentials and recent updates to projected energy use, HFC emissions and land CO 2 uptake. Moreover, we make upward revisions to CH 4 emissions based on recent regional, US and global assessments. We also perform a comprehensive uncertainty analysis. See Methods for more information.
Our revised estimates produce a range in 2005 net GHG emissions from 6,323 to 7,403 MtCO 2 e (full uncertainty range). We then estimate GHG emission impacts for a number of policies listed in Table 1 , based on the US INDC. In addition, we include some policies not specified in the INDC, including commercial building codes, targets for manure and fertilizer management, and recent California legislation. Reduction estimates and uncertainty ranges are based on published reports by the federal government, independent entities or our own analysis. Some policies mentioned in the INDC, as well as existing state policies, are not modelled as they are included in the 2015 US Department of Energy's Annual Energy Outlook 6 baseline, from which our analysis proceeds. 14 . Only residential building codes were specified in the US INDC. Because such codes cannot be mandated federally and are adopted to varying degrees at the state level, we have categorized future residential building codes as a Category B action. For commercial building codes, we have categorized future actions as Category C since no federal targets have been specified. Combining all of our 2025 estimates together, including uncertainties arising both from the inherent range of impacts as well as parameter uncertainty, results in GHG emission reduction ranges shown in Table 1 and Fig. 2 .
The CPP contributes the most to GHG emissions reductions. Two versions are modelled: the final rule, and an enhanced version based on the proposed rule. The final rule, published in October 2015 7 , is included in Category A, with estimated reductions from 221 to 267 MtCO 2 e in 2025. These estimates do not include some additional reductions that may have been assumed to take place elsewhere in the energy system. However, the earlier proposed rule is much more ambitious 8 , with total savings that are more than twice as large; therefore, this policy is included in Category C as something that the US might later pursue.
Five other policies-CH 4 oil and gas aspirational target 9 , California's 2030 GHG target 10 , two HFC policies (the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)'s Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) 11 and Montreal Protocol amendment 12 ), and the heavy-duty vehicle efficiency proposed rule 13 -each have impacts of between 36 and 146 MtCO 2 e, or 3.2 to 10.7% of total reductions. Of these, only SNAP is a Category A policy. We estimate that the remaining 10 policies, which span Categories A, B and C, collectively reduce emissions between 177 and 251 MtCO 2 e (16.1 to 18.3% of total reductions).
The US INDC pledges a 26 to 28% reduction below the 2005 GHG emission level in 2025. Considering the uncertainties discussed above, this produces a 2025 target ranging from 4,553 to 5,478 MtCO 2 e. The difference between this target and the estimated 2025 emissions without INDC policies results in an 'emissions gap' ranging from 896 to 2,121 MtCO 2 e, with a reference value of 1,510 MtCO 2 e corresponding to a 4.8% reduction below the 2005 level.
Including policies that the US has actively adopted (Category A) results in remaining emissions between 5,230 and 7,135 MtCO 2 e. While it would appear that there is some overlap with the target emissions range, as the high end of the 2025 target is higher than the low end of remaining emissions, this is not the case. Because of the way these ranges are correlated with common assumptions about energy-related CO 2 emissions, land sinks, and CH 4 emissions, the estimated emissions gap after including Category A reductions is 551 to 1,805 MtCO 2 e, or 8.7 to 24.4% of the 2005 level. See Fig. 3 .
Including Category B policies results in an emissions gap of 340 to 1,586 MtCO 2 e, while including Category C policies as well lowers the gap to between −356 and 924 MtCO 2 e. While the low end of this latter range is indeed negative, indicating emissions 5.6% lower than the maximum 2025 target (26% below the 2005 level), it corresponds to favourable assumptions for all parameters, and implementation of all policies. The upper end, corresponding to less favourable parameter assumptions, is 12.5% above the minimum 2025 target (28% below the 2005 level), indicating that further reductions will be necessary to close this gap with confidence. We briefly discuss policy options below; for more information, see Supplementary Discussion.
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LETTERS 0 E n h a n c e d In the electricity sector, an aggressive phase-out of coal and natural gas generation, with accompanying increases in renewables, energy efficiency and possibly nuclear generation could be enacted. As an example, California plans to meet a 33% renewable electricity target in 2020, and 50% in 2030 14 , as well as phase-out coal generation by 2030 15 . Several other states 16 are also actively reducing electricity-sector GHG emissions. Together, these strategies could even exceed proposed rule CPP reductions (see Supplementary Discussion, 'Extensions of the CPP').
Vehicle electrification represents an important GHG emission reduction strategy in the transportation sector, due to the lower GHG intensity of electricity-versus petroleum-powered vehicles. California and seven other states 17 have a 2025 target of 3.3 million zero net emission vehicles; if scaled to the US, it would encompass 16 million vehicles, 6% of projected stock. Such a target could save more than 50 MtCO 2 e and also reduce air pollution.
Policies that shift mobility use from private vehicles to lower GHG modes (public transit, non-motorized mobility, and ondemand shared-ride vehicles), such as in California 18 , could be strengthened. Moreover, vehicle automation could significantly lower GHG emissions 19 , although increased usage might undermine some savings.
Current biofuels targets have been reduced from 36 billion gallons of ethanol-equivalent originally proposed for 2022 20 . However, there may be more than 1 billion tonnes of US biomass available by 2030, sufficient for 70 billion gallons 21 , with significant GHG savings.
Hydrogen can be produced from many sources and could reduce GHG emissions across multiple sectors. Federal spending of ∼US$100 million annually supports ambitious hydrogen production, storage and fuel cell goals, but more could be done to realize them, such as increased commercialization and infrastructure efforts 22 . Electrifying building and industrial heating can reduce emissions when electricity has a lower GHG emissions intensity than fossil sources 23 . Electric heat pumps are far more efficient than combustion, and high-temperature industrial approaches can provide higher throughput, space savings and improved quality 24 . The majority of oil and gas sector CH 4 leaks probably come from a minority of 'super-emitters' that, if identified and addressed, could reduce sector emissions 65 to 87% 25 . Moreover, landfill CH 4 emissions could be reduced by 90% in new facilities, and up to 60% in older ones 26 . The use of slow-release fertilizers has been shown to reduce N 2 O emissions by 35%, without a corresponding increase in labour 27 . With the majority of the 345 MtCO 2 e of estimated 2025 N 2 O emissions due to agriculture, such an application would result in much larger reductions than assumed under current federal policy 5 .
Additional HFC reductions of ∼33% or 82 MtCO 2 e yr −1 in 2025 could come from more aggressive Montreal Protocol amendments 28 . A variety of land management practices could enhance carbon storage, reducing 2030 CO 2 emissions by >40 MtCO 2 e yr −1 in California (The Nature Conservancy, unpublished data, 2015), with greater potential nationally.
Finally, GHG emissions trading now being pursued in a handful of US states 10, 29 as well as internationally 30 could unlock lowcost GHG reduction strategies, lowering total emissions while saving money.
In 32 , and the US Environmental Protection Agency finalized its CH 4 emissions standards for oil/gas and landfill sectors on June 3, 2016 and July 15, 2016, respectively 33, 34 . All these changes elevate the corresponding policies from Category B to A. However, this Letter was resubmitted before these changes occurred, so they were not incorporated in the analysis.
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Methods
Historical US GHG emissions were obtained from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)'s 2015 GHG emissions inventory 35 , which provided annual historical estimates from 1990 to 2013. We also examined emissions data from EPA's 2014 GHG emissions inventory 36 , which provided annual historical estimates from 1990 to 2012, for additional information about HFC and perfluorocarbon (PFC) emissions. EPA's 2016 draft inventory 37 reported emissions to 2014, and makes important revisions to prior year estimates, suggesting that historical (including 2005) net emissions were higher by >300 MtCO 2 e yr −1 . However, as the data were not finalized, we did not utilize them in our analysis.
Other The SBR was released after our initial analysis was completed, and its projected baseline GHG emissions included some, but not all, policies we modelled in our analysis. As a result, it was not possible to use the SBR projections to represent future emissions in the absence of federal actions in support of the US INDC. Therefore, we have retained the CAR projections with some important modifications.
For energy-related CO 2 emissions, we used 2015 AEO projections 6 modified to subtract bunker fuel emissions (in accordance with Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) inventory reporting guidelines 4 ), and included projected emissions from US territories estimated from historical EPA data 35 . We also subtracted some industrial CO 2 emissions reported by the CAR as non-energy emissions. (The 2016 AEO, which included projections with and without the CPP, was released too recently to be incorporated into this analysis. However, we did utilize a small additional GHG saving arising from outside the electricity sector as a result of the CPP that was not included in the EPA analysis 8 ; see Supplementary Methods, 'Historical and projected baseline US GHG emissions' for details.)
For non-energy CO 2 emissions, we retained the CAR projections (none were separately provided in the SBR). For land use CO 2 , we used SBR projections, as they reflected important recent revisions in estimated future land use practices and resulting CO 2 absorption. Emissions of non-CO 2 GHGs were expressed in CO 2 equivalent units using 100-year global warming potentials (GWPs) from either the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) 39 or Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) 40 . The AR4 GWPs were used in the US INDC and all data sets except the EPA's 2014 GHG inventory and the CAR, which used SAR GWPs. For consistency, we converted non-CO 2 emissions from SAR to AR4 GWPs, as described in Supplementary Methods, 'Global warming potentials (GWPs). ' We retained these adjusted CAR emission projections for N 2 O, PFCs and SF 6 . For HFCs, however, the EPA recently made significant upward revisions to projected baseline emissions in its 2015 SNAP report 11 , so we used those projections instead. A number of recent studies point toward important differences between CH 4 emission estimates from EPA, and those based on measurements obtained from towers, aeroplanes and satellites [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] . As a result, we used a correction factor of 1.50 +0. To characterize uncertainty in energy-related CO 2 projections, we examined the 2015 AEO reference case along with 13 side cases 6 . We found that total CO 2 emissions in 2025 varied by approximately ±4%, and used this range to characterize future uncertainty. The additional uncertainty arising from our modifications to the AEO projections were found to be negligible. See Supplementary Methods, 'Uncertainty estimates, ' for details. For CH 4 , as noted above, we used a correction factor with uncertainty bounds. In addition to the above uncertainties, we used EPA's own uncertainty estimates 35 for GHG emissions in 2013 to estimate intrinsic uncertainty. We used separate 95% uncertainty interval estimates for each GHG except for CO 2 , where we used separate uncertainty estimates for energy, non-energy and land sink emissions. We assumed that the relative uncertainty in each GHG category would remain the same in other years, including 2005 and 2025, and applied these estimates to all adjusted emissions estimates except CH 4 (since our own estimate of uncertainty was far larger than what EPA assumed).
EPA parameter uncertainty estimates were combined in quadrature as per standard error propagation methods. Other sources of uncertainty, which had minimum/maximum ranges but no formal confidence intervals, were linearly combined (that is, without quadrature) to obtain a maximum uncertainty range, which we refer to as 'full uncertainties. '
For each INDC policy listed in Table 1 , we developed GHG reduction estimates based on federal government analyses, extrapolations from independent analyses, and synthesis from scientific literature. 'High' and 'low' bracketing uncertainty estimates were developed for most policies; others utilized single-point values. To these ranges we added intrinsic uncertainties described above to arrive at full uncertainty estimates. When subtracting GHG emissions policy reductions from baseline emissions, care was taken to include intrinsic uncertainties only afterward, to avoid overestimating the uncertainty.
More details are given in Supplementary Methods, 'Modelled policies, ' but in brief, we estimated 2025 policy impacts as follows: (1) Clean power plan. We used EPA's analysis of its final rule (Category A, despite a current legal challenge 48 ) to obtain a range of GHG savings 8 Oil and gas. We used the Administration's estimate of its proposed rule 54 (Category B; see 'Note added in proof ') GHG savings range. We also used the Administration's aspirational target (Category C) of a 40 to 45% sector reduction from the 2012 level by 2025 55 .
Landfills. Category B (see 'Note added in proof ') savings are based on an EPA proposed rule analysis 56 .
Manure management. We base savings on the Administration's voluntary biogas roadmap 57 (Category C) savings estimates.
No other federal policies exist with quantitative reduction targets for CH 4 , so none were included. ) 59 . (9) California policies. California has the most aggressive GHG emissions reductions policy of any state in the US 60 . We used the CALGAPS model 61 to simulate recently passed California renewable portfolio standard and building efficiency legislation (SB350, Category A) and the statewide GHG emissions reduction target (Executive Order B-30-15, Category B; see 'Note added in proof '). These policies are additional to the federal CPP, because California is expected to meet its CPP obligations with existing policies 'years ahead of schedule' 62 and projects its own GHG emissions in 2030 to be 34% below the CPP target 63 , or 15 MtCO 2 e, higher than our estimated savings from SB350. The statewide GHG emissions reduction target is estimated from the difference between the 2030 target of 40% below the 1990 level 10 and expected emissions from all other existing policies 61 .
